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Jonesing For A Taste of Competition: 
Why an Antiquated Maritime Law 
Needs Reform 
William H. Yost III* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, commonly referred to as 
the Jones Act, is perhaps America’s most revered piece of 
admiralty legislation.  The historic law is best known for providing 
seamen—the “Wards of Admiralty”1—with a mechanism to sue 
their employers in court for negligence.2  Lesser known provisions 
of the Jones Act, however, serve as the basis of America’s 
 
*Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2013; 
B.A., Fairfield University, 2006.  The author would like to thank Jonathan 
Gutoff, an invaluable resource for all things maritime, Sheila O’Rourke and 
the Notes and Comments team for their thoughtful feedback and 
encouragement during the drafting process, and the Articles Editors who 
worked diligently on the final preparations of this article.  Many thanks also 
to my parents who encouraged me to attend law school and have helped me 
along the way.     
 1.  See generally The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123 (U.S. 1936) 
(“The [Jones Act] was remedial, for the benefit and protection of seamen who 
are peculiarly the wards of admiralty.”). 
 2.  “A seaman injured in the course of employment or, if the seaman 
dies from the injury, the personal representative of the seaman may elect to 
bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the 
employer. Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal injury 
to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an action under this section.”  46 
U.S.C § 30104 (2006).  Contrast this with the majority of employment 
scenarios wherein an injured employee can recover workers’ compensation 
benefits, but is prohibited from bringing a direct negligence claim against his 
employer. 
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cabotage, or “coastwise” laws, which regulate the transportation of 
goods between two points in the same country.3  These sections of 
the Jones Act mandate that only U.S.-owned ships transport goods 
from one port in the United States to another.4  In addition, U.S. 
ships engaged in coastwise trade must be purchased in America, 
must receive maintenance and be repaired only in U.S. shipyards 
and must employ crews in which seventy-five percent of the 
members are U.S. citizens.5  While popular and vigorously 
defended in America’s maritime community, the Jones Act is a 
facially protectionist law that has had damaging effects on 
America’s economy as a whole and, in fact, may actually serve to 
restrict the maritime industry in this current era of expected 
maritime growth. 
This Comment argues that the Jones Act is an antiquated 
law, troubled since its passage over ninety years ago, no longer 
serving either its intended purpose or its modern justifications for 
existence, and should be reformed.  Part I considers the legislative 
intent of the Jones Act, its treatment in courts, and the modern 
security-related justifications for the law.  Part II examines the 
detrimental economic impact the Jones Act imposes on three 
groups: cargo shipping companies, consumers, and shipbuilders.  
Part III argues that the Jones Act is both a potential obstacle to 
environmental disaster response and an impediment to a 
developing area of expected maritime growth.  Part IV sets forth 
proposals for Jones Act reform which are based primarily on 
comparisons between the Jones Act to the cabotage law of other 
nations. 
I.  THE BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE JONES ACT, ITS TREATMENT 
IN COURTS, AND MODERN JUSTIFICATIONS 
A. Historical Background 
While the Merchant Marine Act was passed in 1920, cabotage 
 
 3.  The word cabotage comes from the French word, caboter, which 
means to sail coastwise or by the capes—the visible points on the shore.  
Kathleen Magee, U.S. Cabotage Laws: Protective or Damaging? M.A. Project, 
Monterey Institute of Institutional Studies (Apr. 2002), available at 
http://www.commercialdiplomacy.org/pdf/ma_projects/magee.pdf. 
 4.  46 U.S.C § 55102 (2006).  
 5.  Id. 
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laws have existed in the United States for as long as it has 
enjoyed independence.6  In 1789, the first Congress passed “An 
Act Imposing Duties on Tonnage,” which levied a duty on foreign 
ships for coastwise trade of fifty cents per ton, while the duty for 
U.S. ships was six cents per ton.7  In 1817, Congress passed “An 
Act concerning the navigation of the United States,” which 
explicitly reserved coastwise trade to only U.S.-flagged vessels on 
penalty of forfeiture of the merchandise.8  While various other 
pieces of legislation were passed prior to the Jones Act to prevent 
circumvention of the basic protectionist principle set forth in the 
1817 Act,9 the historical underpinnings that contributed to and 
necessitated the Jones Act were distinct from that purpose.10 
In the years leading up to World War I, Congress established 
the Shipping Board and provided it with funding to construct 
vessels for U.S.-flag steamship services.11  However, by the time 
Congress declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917, the Shipping 
Board was faced with a shipping crisis: the United States simply 
lacked the ships necessary to transport and supply its troops for a 
war in Europe.12 In response, it created a subsidiary, the 
 
 6.  See Constantine G. Papavizas & Bryant E. Gardner, Is the Jones Act 
Redundant? 21 U.S.F. MAR. L.J.  95, 97 (2008-09), available at 
http://winston.com/siteFiles/Publications/15%20Papavitzas_Gardner%2021.1.
pdf. 
 7.  Id.; An Impact Imposing Duties on Tonnage, 1 Stat. 27 (1789), 
available at YALE LAW SCHOOL, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century 
/qw08.asp.   Tonnage refers to the cargo carrying capacity of a vessel. Id.  
 8.  Papivas, supra note 6, at 99; Magee, supra note 3, at 20. 
 9.  See Papivas, supra note 6, at 100. 
 10.  See RENE DE LA PEDRAJA, THE RISE & DECLINE OF U.S. MERCHANT 
SHIPPING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 53-63 (1992). 
 11.  Id. at 53. 
 12.  The following excerpt provides an apt illustration of this crisis:  
The shipping difficulties were tremendously compounded by the U.S. 
entry into World War I.  [Edward N.] Hurley [chairman of the 
Shipping Board] inherited the large and apparently insoluble 
problem of carrying and supplying U.S. troops.  To transport General 
John J. Pershing and the vanguard of the American Expeditionary 
Force to France, the Shipping Board had to strip the coastwise and 
intercoastal steamship companies like Luckenbach, American-
Hawaiian, and the Ward Line of their passenger liners and add 
three of the navy’s four troop transports, one of the U.S.-flag 
passenger liners of the International Mercantile Marine, and two 
passenger-cargo ships of the United Fruit Company.  The motley 
flotilla sailed under U.S. Navy escort on 14 June but it was unable to 
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Emergency Fleet Corporation, and together embarked on a 
historic shipbuilding campaign.13  Just as the shipbuilding 
program was gaining traction, the war unexpectedly ended on 
November 11, 1918, and the Emergency Fleet Corporation 
suddenly needed to decide the fate of over one thousand partly-
constructed ships.14 
The Jones Act, signed on June 5, 1920, enabled the Shipping 
Board to sell the excess ships at deeply discounted prices to 
private operators in an effort to create and benefit American 
steamship companies.15  It has been argued that the true original 
intent of the Jones Act had little to deal with cabotage laws, and 
was actually concocted mainly as a solution to deal with this 
government-controlled surplus of merchant vessels.16  Ironically, 
the shipping market collapsed in 1920, not long after the passage 
of the Jones Act, because many of the shipping companies that 
had purchased vessels in 1919 did so at considerably higher prices 
on borrowed money, and went into bankruptcy in 1920.17 
B. Purpose 
In order to determine if the Jones Act is still a necessary law, 
it is important to understand the legislative purpose and intent of 
the act and whether those concerns and objectives remain true 
today.  The Merchant Marine Act, passed in 1920, was written 
with a clear objective: 
It is necessary for the national defense and the 
development of the domestic and foreign commerce of the 
United States that the United States have a merchant 
marine—(1) sufficient to carry the waterborne domestic 
commerce and a substantial part of the waterborne 
 
carry the whole force.  As only one of the ships had been designed for 
transatlantic travel, they were simply too small.  Reluctantly the 
Shipping Board had to turn to British-flag ships, including those of 
the International Mercantile Marine, to transport the overwhelming 
majority of the American Expeditionary Force, with Navy escorts 
along part of the voyage being the only U.S.-flag participation.   
Id. at 55-56. 
 13.  Id. at 54. 
 14.  Id. at 58. 
 15.  Id. at 62. 
 16.  Papavizas, supra note 6, at 104. 
 17.  PEDRAJA, supra note 10, at 63. 
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export and import foreign commerce of the United States 
and to provide shipping service essential for maintaining 
the flow of the waterborne domestic and foreign 
commerce at all times; (2) capable of serving as a naval 
and military auxiliary in time of war or national 
emergency.18 
Thus, it seems as though the legislature was primarily 
concerned with its ability to maintain a strong and stable 
merchant marine, and wanted the capability to summon American 
merchant vessels to serve the military in times of war or national 
emergency.19 
C. Treatment in Courts 
The judicial branch, over the years, has seemingly lost touch 
with the stated purpose (or the historical underpinnings) of the 
Jones Act—to promote a merchant marine capable of serving the 
military—and instead has interpreted it as having a clear, 
protectionist purpose.20  For example, in 1970, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Marine Carriers Corp. 
v. Fowler, referred to the cabotage provisions of the Jones Act as 
“unabashedly protectionist.”21  It noted that the aims of the Jones 
Act are “to protect the American shipping industry already 
engaged in the coastwise trade, to provide work for American 
shipyards, and to improve and enhance the American Merchant 
Marine.”22  In fact, Circuit Judge Irving R. Kaufman opined that: 
 
 18.  46 U.S.C.S. § 50101 (2006).  The remaining objectives include: (3) 
owned and operated as vessels of the United States by citizens of the United 
States; (4) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable types of 
vessels constructed in the United States and manned with a trained and 
efficient citizen personnel; and (5) supplemented by efficient facilities for 
building and repairing vessels.  Id.  The Merchant Marine Act is commonly 
referred to as the Jones Act and is named after Senator Wesley L. Jones who 
was the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce in 1920.  Papaviza, 
supra note 6, at 96. 
 19.  Query whether this service could violate the Third Amendment. 
 20.  See Marine Carriers Corp. v. Fowler, 429 F.2d 702, 708 (2d Cir. 
1970). 
 21.  Id.  The case concerned whether a rebuilt vessel was eligible for 
coastwise trade, and involved a factual dispute as to whether it was a rebuilt 
American vessel or a rebuilt foreign vessel.  Id. at 704. 
 22.  Id.;  see also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 4 C.I.T. 229, 
233, 551 F. Supp. 1148, 1151 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1982) (“The Merchant Marine 
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Like all maritime nations of the world, the United States 
treats its coastwise shipping trade as a jealously guarded 
preserve. In order to participate in this trade, a vessel’s 
credentials must be thoroughly American. The ship must 
have been built in an American shipyard and be owned by 
American citizens. Moreover, it must not have trifled 
with its American heritage.23  
Even when courts have accurately articulated the legislative 
intent of the Jones Act, such articulations seem of dubious 
practicality for our nation’s current security needs.  In 
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Dillon, the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals correctly noted that “the broad congressional 
purpose underlying [the Jones Act] was to stimulate and 
encourage resort to domestic shipyards and thus ensure them 
sufficient business so that their facilities would be adequate in 
times of national emergency.”24  Similarly, in 1982, the D.C. 
Circuit noted, “[w]e require a sound merchant marine to protect 
foreign trade and to provide support for the armed forces in times 
of war or national emergency. We also require a modern, efficient 
shipbuilding industry capable of providing military vessels in 
times of stress.”25 
D. Modern Justifications—Maritime Security 
Perhaps the most compelling argument in favor of preserving 
the Jones Act is that it promotes the security of the United States, 
but even this argument is frustrated by the existence of modern 
maritime security-related legislation.  Certainly, the Jones Act 
was intended to ensure the existence of a merchant marine ready 
and capable to assist the military in times of war or emergency.  
In the words of the American Maritime Partnership: 
A strong domestic maritime industry is vital to promoting 
 
Act is designed to protect the American shipping industry engaged in 
coastwise trade, to provide work for American shipyards and to improve the 
American merchant marine.”).  
 23.  Fowler, 429 F.2d at 703. 
 24.  Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292, 295 (D.C. Cir. 
1965).  At issue in this case was whether a vessel with a foreign-made 
midsection was eligible for coastwise trade.  Id. at 293. 
 25.  Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 
911 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
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national, homeland and economic security. The Jones Act 
establishes a U.S. merchant marine of skilled seafarers 
and U.S.-flagged vessels essential for maintaining the 
flow of domestic waterborne commerce that is also 
capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in 
times of war or national emergency. The U.S. Navy 
considers the Jones Act “critical to national security” and 
every U.S. President of this generation has supported the 
maritime law.26 
In addition, there has emerged a post 9/11 national security 
argument which asserts that repealing the Jones Act would 
permit increased access to our ports by international fleets, and 
could enable infiltration by terrorists.27  The Lexington Institute, 
a non-profit think tank which focuses on national security among 
other issues, has published a report about the Jones Act’s 
contributions to national security in which it states: 
Since September 11, the United States has sought to 
create a multi-layered system to protect the United 
States from state-based and terrorist attack while 
continuing to permit the free flow of legitimate goods, 
services and people across the nation’s borders. A key 
element in the national strategy to secure the homeland 
is to gain sufficient visibility into movement of goods and 
people to the United States so as to uncover and interdict 
any attempt to use the global transportation network to 
launch an attack. Although the Jones Act was not written 
with today’s threats to homeland security in mind, its 
provisions provide an important base on which to build 
the systems, processes and procedures needed to secure 
America. The provisions in the Jones Act regarding vessel 
ownership and manning simplify efforts to ensure that 
 
 26.  News, Governor Rick Perry Expresses Support For Jones Act, 
AMERICAN MARITIME PARTNERSHIP (Nov. 3 2011), http://www.mctf.com   
/news/2011/Gov%20Perry%20Jones%20Act%20Statement.html. The America- 
n Maritime Partnership is a broad-based coalition that represents the 
interests of the domestic maritime industry.  Id.  
 27.  Dr. Daniel Goure, The Contribution of The Jones Act To U.S. 
Security, The Lexington Institute (Oct. 2011), available at 
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/Contr
ibution_of_the_Jones_Act.pdf.    
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rogue regimes and international terrorists cannot strike 
at this country via its ports and waterways. One could 
readily assert that were there no Jones Act, Congress 
would have to invent one.28 
In response to the 9/11 attacks, maritime vulnerabilities with 
respect to terrorism have been mitigated, or at least addressed, by 
both international and domestic agreements and legislation.29  
The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (“ISPS”), 
signed by parties to the International Convention on the Safety of 
Life at Sea (“SOLAS Convention”), came into force in 2004 and 
has mandated that ships and ports engaged in international trade 
implement ship and port security plans respectively.30  These 
plans require strict documentation of all security procedures and 
the continuous monitoring for and recording of security 
irregularities.31  Domestically, the Maritime Security Act of 2002 
mandates that U.S. vessels follow the ISPS Code.32  In addition, 
the Coast Guard requires all vessels, regardless of their country of 
registration to submit a notice of arrival to a given U.S. port 96 
hours in advance.33  This advanced notice provides the port with 
the opportunity to investigate that vessel’s origin and recent 
destinations to determine if it has traveled to any ports around 
 
 28.  Id.  The Lexington Institute’s mission is, in pertinent part, to:   
[i]nform, educate, and shape the public debate of national priorities 
in those areas that are of surpassing importance to the future 
success of democracy, such as national security, education reform, 
tax reform, immigration and federal policy concerning science and 
technology. By promoting America's ability to project power around 
the globe we not only defend the homeland of democracy, but also 
sustain the international stability in which other free-market 
democracies can thrive.  
Mission, The Lexington Institute, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/mission. 
 29.  See JOSEPH AHLSTROM, VESSEL SECURITY OFFICER, Cornell Maritime 
Press, 1-2, 49 (2006).   
 30.  Id.  The SOLAS Convention is an international convention 
concerning the safety of merchant ships.  Its first version came in 1914 in 
response to the Titanic disaster, and has been updated periodically ever 
since. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, http://www.imo.org/about 
/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-convention-for-the-safety-
of-life-at-sea-(solas),-1974.aspx. 
 31.  AHLSTROM, supra note 29, at 2. 
 32.  Id.     
 33.  Id. at 49.   
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the world which have recently experienced a security incident 
before it grants entry.34 
In terms of international access to actual port facilities and 
cargo, it may be a surprise that the majority of port terminals in 
the United States are actually leased to foreign shipping 
companies by the particular port authorities.35  Despite this, the 
cargo is actually handled—loaded and unloaded—by 
longshoremen who are American, unionized dockworkers.36 
Therefore, between the Maritime Transportation Security Act, 
Coast Guard regulations, and the existence of unionized 
dockworkers, there is little reason to believe that liberalizing 
domestic cabotage laws would increase America’s vulnerability to 
terrorist attacks. 
II. THE ECONOMIC DANGERS OF PROTECTIONISM 
“It is important to recognize that while protectionist 
legislation may offer relief to a specific domestic industry, 
the interests of corporate America are not served by the 
protectionist revival.”37 
“Once protectionist tariffs were for infant industries; now 
they are for the old and putatively senile.”38 
During the past decade, there has been a robust and growing 
discussion in America about the benefits and implications of free 
trade, and whether to liberalize this nation’s trade policy.39  At the 
forefront of this debate is determining the proper role of tariffs in 
foreign trade, which are widely considered the preeminent tool of 
protectionist lawmaking.  While the Jones Act is not a tariff in the 
 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See The Committee on Int’l Trade, The Ramifications of the Port 
Security Legislation on Trade and National Security, 63 THE REC., 161, 165 
(2008) [hereinafter Ramifications].   
 36.  Id. at 167.   
 37.  LOUIS E. V. NEVAER AND STEVEN A. DECK, THE PROTECTIONIST THREAT 
TO CORPORATE AMERICA 67 (1989).  
 38.  Id. (quoting John Kenneth Galbraith, a noted economist). 
 39.  See Alan Wm. Wolff, America’s Trade Policy Agenda and the Future 
of U.S. Trade Negotiations: Testimony Before the House Ways and Means 
Committee 1, 12 (Feb. 29, 2012), available at http://waysandmeans. 
house.gov/UploadedFiles/WolfftestFC229.pdf; Rachel Brewster, The 
Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking International Trade 
and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 15 (2011). 
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traditional sense, its protectionist effects can hardly be disputed.  
Yet, there is also little dispute that the outright repeal of the 
Jones Act would create an immediate, and perhaps lasting, loss of 
jobs in America’s maritime industry.  Former Vice-Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve Robert W. Ferguson once commented that 
when “[b]alancing the pain for a few against the lasting gains for 
the economy as a whole, economists generally view the latter as 
outweighing the former, but it is admittedly difficult for many 
individuals in American society to share this assessment.”40 
There is, perhaps, no better example of how this “pain for a 
few” has been the driving force in maintaining a protectionist 
policy than with the U.S. Merchant Marine’s unified voice in 
preserving the Jones Act.41  However, it is no secret that 
protectionist policies have adverse impacts on the economy and 
nation as a whole.  As Ferguson noted, protectionist actions 
“reduce variety and raise costs for consumers; they distort the 
allocation of resources in the economy by encouraging excessive 
resources to flow into protected sectors; and they foster 
inefficiency by reducing the extent of competition.”42  While 
Ferguson was speaking generally about the consequences of 
import tariffs, an easy analogy can be drawn to protectionist 
coastwise trade laws; in fact, two of the three of consequences 
Ferguson highlights are strikingly consistent with the effects of 
the Jones Act.43 
 
 40.  Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice Chairman, Fed. Res., Remarks at the 
Conference on Trade and the Future of American Workers (Oct. 7, 2004),  
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/2004100 
7/default.htm. 
 41.  See About Us: Objectives, TRANSPORTATION INST. (last visited Sept. 
13, 2012), http://www.trans-inst.org/index.html (the Transportation Institute 
is a maritime organization dedicated to maintaining a strong U.S. merchant 
marine and advocates for the preservation of the Jones Act). 
 42.  Ferguson, supra note 40.  Ferguson also noted other “highly 
egregious consequences” of protectionist policies, including:  
First, by raising the cost of goods that are inputs for other producers, 
import barriers may destroy more jobs in so-called ‘downstream’ 
sectors than they save in protected sectors. According to one study, 
the 2002 steel safeguard program contributed to higher steel prices 
that eliminated about 200,000 jobs in steel-using industries, whereas 
only 187,500 workers were employed by U.S. steel-producers in 
December 2002.  
Id.  
 43.  The second consequence, “they distort the allocation of resources in 
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A. Reduced Variety and Increased Costs for Consumers 
When considering Ferguson’s point regarding reduced variety 
and increased costs for consumers, there are at least two groups of 
consumers directly impacted.  The first group is the coastwise 
shippers—companies that own or charter shipping vessels to 
transport cargo.  These companies are required not only to 
purchase American-made vessels, but also must have all 
subsequent repairs performed in America.44  The second group is 
the everyday American consumer—any person that purchases 
goods that, at some point, were shipped from one port in this 
country to another.  Because of the Jones Act, the shipping 
company, which cannot purchase foreign-made, competitively-
priced ships or repair its ships in more competitive, foreign 
shipping yards, is saddled with higher capital costs.  Not 
surprisingly, a portion of these higher capital costs are passed on 
to the American consumer in the form of higher prices for goods on 
the shelves and at the pump. 
 1. Shippers 
The U.S.-build requirement of the Jones Act not only raises 
the capital expenditures for existing shipping companies in 
theory, but also creates barriers of entry making it difficult for 
prospective shipping companies to enter the market.  In terms of 
cost, it is estimated that the expense of constructing a Jones Act 
ship in America is roughly three to four times what it would cost 
for the construction of an equivalent ship in Asia.45  In addition, 
the mandates for maintenance and repair to be performed only in 
the United States impose additional costs for this group and make 
it difficult for shippers to compete with land-based alternatives for 
cargo transport like trucks and rail.46  In fact, comparable ships in 
 
the economy by encouraging excessive resources to flow into protected 
sectors,” more aptly applies to government subsidies.  Id. 
 44.  See 46 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012). 
 45.   Paul Slater, Maritime Leader: Throw Out Jones Act Requirement for 




 46.  William O. Gray, Performance of US Shipyards in the 20th / 21st 
Century, 24[4] J.OF SHIP PRODUCTION, 202 (2008). 
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Third World nations are able to replace vessels with less 
frequency than in the U.S. because maintenance and repair costs 
are less cumbersome enabling a longer ship lifespan.47 
Not surprisingly, many American shipping companies have 
avoided replacing their Jones Act-eligible vessels for as long as 
possible, but that trend likely will forcibly end in the near 
future.48  In fact, the average deep-draft ocean-going shipping 
vessel servicing the noncontiguous United States (Alaska, Hawaii, 
and Puerto Rico) is twenty-eight years old.49  Comparatively, most 
foreign shipping companies replace equivalent vessels after 
twenty-five years.50  While this may not seem like a significant 
difference, it should be emphasized that this is not an apples to 
apples comparison; rather, it compares the average age of 
American ocean-going vessels currently in operation (many of 
which are owned by shipping companies facing serious financial 
straits) with the average replacement age of equivalent foreign 
vessels.  When American shipping companies finally decide to 
invest in a new construction out of necessity, they are faced with 
numerous difficulties: 
The major U.S. shipbuilding yards do not deliver new 
ships [with foreign-inspired innovations] because they 
have become uncompetitive under the protectionist shield 
of the Jones Act. The cost of building large oceangoing 
ships in the United States is at least three times greater 
than at the internationally competitive shipyards in 
Japan and South Korea. The process of contracting for a 
commercial oceangoing ship from a major U.S. 
shipbuilding yard is cumbersome, fraught with 
difficulties and subject to delays in delivery and 
significant cost overruns. These contracting practices 
reflect the U.S. shipyards’ heavy reliance on military 
 
 47.  DE LA PEDRAJA, supra note 10, at 137. 
 48.  See Michael Hansen, US-Build Requirement For Ships: Dilemma for 
Hawaii, Guam, Alaska, and Puerto Rico, HAWAI’I FREE PRESS, Jan. 26, 2012, 
http://hawaiifreepress.com/ArticlesMain/tabid/56/articleType/ 
ArticleView/articleId/5974/USBuild-requirement-for-ships-Dilemma-for-
Hawaii-Guam-Alaska-and-Puerto-Rico.aspx. [hereinafter Hansen Dilemma]. 
 49.  Id.   
 50.  Slater, supra note 45. 
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construction.51  
An illustrative example of the adverse effects of the Jones 
Act’s U.S.-build requirement on an American shipping company 
involves one of the nation’s leading shipping companies, Horizon 
Lines.  Horizon Lines currently owns or leases twenty 
containerships and is one of two main shipping companies that 
services Hawaii.52  However, it is also in the midst of a financial 
crisis and needs to determine what will become of its fleet of 
containerships which are an average of thirty-five years old.53  A 
few years ago, the company tried to solve the problem by replacing 
some of its aging Jones Act ships with Korean-made ships to 
service the Guam-Far East trade route (which does not require 
Jones-Act ships).54  This move, however, caused them to lose 
market share of the more profitable Hawaii-West Coast trade to 
their main competitor, Matson Navigation, since the Korean-built 
vessels were not eligible for that trade route.55  The Hawaii-West 
Coast trade route is more profitable in large part because of the 
limited number of shipping companies that service that trade 
route, and by replacing some of its fleet with ineligible Korean-
made vessels Horizon Lines limited its ability to service that 
market.56 Currently, it is estimated that Horizon Lines needs to 
raise at least $2 billion to replace its Jones Act-eligible fleet.57  If 
they are unable to do this then Matson Navigation could end up 
with a near monopoly on the Hawaii-West Coast trade, which 
could have serious implications on the cost of goods. 
Regardless of the outcome of this particular matter, it is clear 
that the U.S.-build requirement of the Jones Act is imposing 
unnecessary costs on shipping companies, and, while their plight 
may fall on deaf ears, their towering capital costs will eventually 
 
 51.  Hansen Dilemma, supra note 48. 
 52.  About Us, HORIZON LINES (last visited Sept. 13, 2012), 
http://www.horizonlines.com/About-Horizon.aspx; Michael Hansen, Horizon 
Lines Troubles Show Need For Reform of US Build Requirement, Hawaii 
Reporter, Sept. 12, 2011, available http://www.hawaiireporter.com/horizon-
lines-troubles-show-need-for-reform-of-us-build-requirement/123. [hereinafter 
Hansen Horizon]. 
 53.  Hansen Dilemma, supra note 48; Hansen Horizon, supra note 52. 
 54.  Hansen Horizon, supra note 52. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id.  
 57.  Id. 
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trickle down and impact the next group, consumers. 
2. Consumers 
The US International Trade Commission (“USITC”) has 
periodically attempted to quantify the economic impact of the 
Jones Act and other protectionist legislation on the American 
economy.58  In 1995, it investigated and attempted to quantify the 
economic effects of U.S. trade restraints, including the Jones Act, 
on the U.S. economy.59  These findings have generally been 
updated every two years.  In 2002, the USITC estimated that 
complete liberalization of the cabotage provisions of the Jones Act 
would create a U.S. economic welfare gain of $656 million,60 and 
in 2009, it calculated that figure at $1.32 billion.61  The 
commission explained that this figure is the “annual reduction in 
real national income imposed by the Jones Act.”62  The potential 
savings of liberalizing the cabotage laws—or the costs imposed 
from maintaining these laws (depending on your prospective)—are 
attributed to the fact that shipping services in the U.S. cost 22 
percent more than equivalent services abroad.63  In applying the 
words of Ferguson, the Jones Act’s imposition of high capital costs 
on domestic shipping has reduced the variety of shipping 
companies available and in turn has raised costs for consumers.64 
B. Inefficiency by Reducing the Extent of Competition 
1. Shipping Companies 
Despite the Jones Act, there has been a gradual but steady 
decline in the number of coastwise shipping companies since the 
1930s—an era which marked the rise of the railroad industry.65  
 
 58.  U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, PUB NO. 3201, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. IMPORT RESTRAINTS I (1999), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3201.pdf [hereinafter 1999 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS]. 
 59.  Id.    
 60.  U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, PUB NO. 3519, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. IMPORT RESTRAINTS XVIII (2002), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3519.pdf. 
 61.  1999 ECONOMIC EFFECTS, supra note 58, at 98. 
 62.  Id.   
 63.  See id. 
 64.  See Ferguson, supra note 40. 
 65.  DE LA PEDRAJA, supra note 10, at 53. 
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While one of the purported intentions of the Jones Act was to 
foster the continued existence of the U.S. merchant marine, in 
reality this law has created significant barriers to entry for the 
domestic shipping industry and has stymied competition in the 
marketplace.66 As federal judge Gustavo A. Gelpi has explained, 
“[b]ecause of U.S. law governing cabotage, which imposes 
extensive requirements for vessels engaged in maritime shipping 
between U.S. ports, it is difficult for new firms to enter the 
market.”67  These barriers to entry are born out of the Jones Act 
either explicitly or consequentially. 
Since the Jones Act prohibits non-U.S.-built, owned, and 
operated vessels from engaging in coastwise trade, foreign 
shipping companies are explicitly barred from entering the U.S. 
market.68  As a consequence of the Jones Act, a prospective 
company seeking to enter the U.S. coastwise shipping market 
must make a sizable capital investment to order the construction 
of a Jones Act-eligible vessel from a U.S. shipping yard.69  Such an 
investment would be two to four times larger than the investment 
necessary to purchase an equivalent vessel from a foreign 
shipping yard.70  In addition, this hypothetical prospective 
shipping company would need to wait approximately three 
unfeasible years for the U.S. shipbuilder to design and construct 
the vessel before it could begin its operations.71  Thus, existing 
U.S. coastwise shipping companies, while not directly subsidized 
by the government, are akin to Amtrak in terms of receiving 
government-created protection from competition.72 
An apt illustration of this lack of competition exists in Hawaii, 
where cargo owners must choose between just two main shipping 
companies Horizon Lines and Matson Navigation.  Recently, a 
 
 66.  See Jackson Thies, The Long Case for Horizon Lines, SEEKING ALPHA 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2012), http://seekingalpha.com/article/136845-the-long-
case-for-horizon-lines. 
 67.  Rivera-Muñiz v. Horizon Lines Inc., 737 F.Supp.2d 57, 60 (D.P.R. 
2010). 
 68.  46 U.S.C. § 55102 (2006). 
 69.  Thies, supra note 66. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See Tad DeHaven, Privatizing Amtrak, THE CATO INSTITUTE, (June 
2010), http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/transportation/amtrak/ 
subsidies.pdf. 
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group of Hawaiian business owners, who either directly or 
indirectly utilize the shipping services of these two companies, 
brought an action against the United States alleging that the 
cabotage provisions of the Jones Act created a frivolous 
obstruction to interstate commerce in Hawaii in violation of the 
Commerce Clause.73  Specifically, the plaintiffs sought to suspend 
the Jones Act in Hawaii, arguing it caused citizens of Hawaii 
“irreparable harm as a result of artificial high prices and 
restrictions on Hawaiian commerce.”74 One of the plaintiffs, a 
former bakery owner whose business went bankrupt, argued that 
the high shipping costs between Hawaii and the U.S. mainland 
was a significant factor in the demise of his business.75  He noted 
that the fees charged by Matson Navigation Co. and other U.S. 
carriers exceeded the fees charged by foreign shippers in 
similarly-distanced world ports by forty percent.76  In an 
unpublished opinion, the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
claims, holding they could not satisfy any of the three standing 
requirements—injury in fact, causation, and redressability.77 
Similarly, disgruntled consumers in Puerto Rico, where 80% 
of all consumer goods are shipped from the U.S. mainland by sea 
and air, filed a class action in 2009 against the three main 
coastwise shipping companies, alleging anti-competitive conduct 
including price-fixing which elevated the prices of goods shipped 
to Puerto Rico.78  The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant 
shipping companies, Horizon Lines, Sea Star Lines and Crowley 
Liner Services, which combined to control 87% of Puerto Rican 
cabotage, uniformly increased their shipping rates since 2003.79  
 
 73.  Kauai Kunana Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 
114123 at *3, *9 (D. Haw. Dec 8, 2009).   
 74.  Id. at *3, *4.   
 75.  Id. at *10. 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id. at *10-15.  Specifically, the court found first that the plaintiffs 
failed to assert specific imminent harm to themselves sufficient to show 
injury in fact.  Id. at *10-14.  Next, the court found that at best the plaintiffs 
demonstrated a correlation between the Jones Act and their companies’ 
demise, but the speculative affidavits used for this showing fell short of 
establishing causation.  Id. at *14-15.  The court concluded that the plaintiffs 
failed to demonstrated that their purported injury would be addressed by a 
favorable decision.  Id. at *14-15. 
 78.  Rivera-Muñiz, 737 F.Supp.2d at 59-60, 62. 
 79.  Id. at 60.  Horizon provides approximately 35% of Puerto Rican 
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Unlike the plaintiffs in Kauai Lunana Dairy, the plaintiffs here 
did not question the validity or constitutionality of the Jones Act; 
despite this, the court noted sua sponte, that U.S. cabotage laws 
obstruct new companies from entering the market.80  Therefore, a 
reasonable inference can be made that the Jones Act promotes or 
at least enables anti-competitive practices among shipping 
companies, which negatively impact consumers.81 
2. Ship Builders 
During World War II, the United States embarked on a 
prolific shipbuilding campaign which, by the end of the war, 
enabled the nation to proclaim itself the proud possessor of the 
world’s largest merchant fleet—an ostensibly enviable 
distinction.82  In reality, the superfluous U.S. merchant fleet of 
five thousand vessels destroying demand in the market, combined 
with the innovative Japanese rebuilding their shipyards from 
scratch with cheap labor, created a crisis for U.S. shipbuilders 
from which it has never recovered.83  After World War II, the 
Japanese shipbuilders eventually captured market share from 
foreign nations by implementing greater efficiencies and 
reinvesting profits into new technologies.84  In contrast, it is not 
unfair to characterize American shipbuilding as inferior to foreign 
 
cabotage, Crowley accounts for approximately 31%, and Sea Star accounts for 
approximately 21%.  Id.  The remaining 13% is provided by Trailer Bridge 
Inc. who was not a defendant in the lawsuit.  Id.  The court indicated that 
Trailer’s small market share was not sufficient to moderate shipping rates.  
Id. at 62.   
 80.  Id. at 60.   
 81.  See id.  In Rivera-Muñiz, the plaintiffs prevailed past the pleading 
stage as the court dismissed the defendants’ motion to dismiss with regards 
to the price fixing claim.  Id. at 62.  Ultimately, the parties settled out of 
court for multi million dollars.  Horizon Lines Reaches Puerto Rico Class 





 82.  DE LA PEDRAJA, supra note 10, at 136-47. 
 83.  Id. at 147; Bruce Nolan, Avondale Closing News is No Surprise to 
Maritime Experts, NOLA (Jul. 18, 2010, 1:00PM), http://www.nola 
.com/business/index.ssf/2010/07/avondale_closing_news_is_no_su.html. 
 84.  Nolan, supra note 83. 
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shipbuilding in terms of both quality and cost.85 The Jones Act’s 
U.S.-build requirement is essentially a government-created 
monopoly that disincentivizes (or at least removes any incentives 
for) U.S. shipbuilders from pursuing innovation; as a result, 
American shipbuilding quality has lagged its counterparts in 
Europe and Asia.86  MIT Professor Ernst Frankel once explained, 
“It is a basic finding of economics that government subsidies, aids, 
protection, and regulation of an industry will cause its 
productivity to decline.”87 
Ironically, as the demand for U.S.-built ships has waned over 
the decades, most U.S. shipyards have been acquired by Northrop 
Grumman or General Dynamics, both of which are large, defense 
contractors.88  These companies are widely known for their 
military contracts, not commercial ship production.89  Since these 
two primary U.S. shipbuilders exist in large part because of their 
contracts with the military, it seems that the Jones Act’s original 
concern—to ensure the adequacy of domestic shipyard facilities in 
times of emergency—will either always be satisfied or has been 
completely frustrated depending on how it is considered.  While 
the two main U.S. shipbuilders are capable and practiced in 
constructing naval ships, the current Jones Act fleet in existence 
today—182 self-propelled vessels (including just 7 tankers and 23 
containerships)—would be of little use to the military in a 
hypothetical conflict.90 
III. MODERN DAY CRITICISM 
A. The BP Oil Spill 
On April 20, 2010, a massive blowout and fire in the well of 
 
 85.  Gray, supra note 46, at 202, 209.  
 86.  See id. at 203. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Joseph Darcy, Short Sea Shipping: Barriers, Incentives, and 
Feasibility of Truck Ferry, (June 2009) (unpublished thesis, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology) (on file with Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Library, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/49879.  
 89.  Id.  
 90.  The Committee on International Trade, The Ramifications of the 
Port Security Legislation on Trade and National Security, 63 The Record, 
161, 165 (2008). [hereinafter Ramifications]. 
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the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico caused 
the worst oil spill in the nation’s history, left 11 men dead, and 
grabbed front-page headlines across the country for months.91  
While the primary discussion focused on the precise dollar figure 
for which to hold BP accountable, just beneath the radar was a 
robust debate about the effects that the Jones Act had on the 
disaster.  Reports surfaced that foreign nations, such as the 
Netherlands and Belgium had offered oil skimmers and other 
vessels to aid in the cleanup, but these vessels were prohibited 
from participating because of the Jones Act.92  The Obama 
Administration was also criticized for its purported failure to 
waive the Jones Act to allow participation from foreign-flagged 
vessels.93  Among the critics was Hawaii Representative Charles 
Djou, who along with representatives from Florida and Texas, 
sent the President a letter in mid-June urging him to waive the 
Jones Act and allow assistance from foreign vessels.94 
Others, however, claimed that reports about the President’s 
failure to waive the Jones Act were completely false.  According to 
the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
and Offshore Drilling, while the federal government did reject 
certain offers of assistance from foreign nations, the decisions 
were based on operational circumstances, not the Jones Act.95  For 
example, the Commission noted that it would have taken several 
weeks for certain Dutch ships to get outfitted and travel to the 
Gulf region.96  The Commission also indicated that the National 
Incident Commander, Admiral Thad Allen, “appear[ed] to have 
 
 91.  See Ben Casselman, Russel Gold, & Angel Gonzalez, Blast Jolts Oil 
World—Gulf Rig Explodes…, WALL ST. J., April 22, 2010, at A1; Jerry 
Markon, Criminal Charges Considered in BP Oil Spill, WASH. POST, March 
29, 2011, www.washingtonpost.com. 
 92.  Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Gulf Cleanup so Slow?, WALL ST. J. , July 
1, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487034260045753396 
50877298556.html. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Djou Calls for Obama to Waive Jones Act to Aid Oil Spill Clean-Up, 
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 16, 2010, available at 
http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/breaking/96443164.html?1d=96443164. 
 95.  National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of 
Offshore Drilling, (2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommission. 
gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINA
L.pdf at 142. 
 96.  Id. at 143. 
YOST DESKTOPPED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2013  4:04 PM 
2013] A TASTE OF COMPETITION 71 
granted waivers and exemptions when requested,” although it did 
not cite any examples.97 
Still others claimed the Jones Act waiver issue had absolutely 
no effect on the cleanup efforts.  For instance, H. Clayton Cook Jr., 
former general counsel of the U.S. Maritime Administration, 
pointed out in an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal that the Jones 
Act permits foreign-flagged vessels to operate in U.S. waters to 
assist in oil cleanups without a waiver.98  In fact, as Cook noted, 
46 U.S.C.S. § 55113 does permit a foreign-flagged vessel to operate 
in U.S. waters to assist in the cleanup of an oil spill as long as 
there is not an adequate number of U.S.-flagged vessels available 
to clean the oil in a timely manner.99  The National Commission 
also noted that the Jones Act was largely inapplicable because it 
does not prevent a vessel from loading up with oil and 
transporting it to more than three miles off the coast.100 
Even if the Jones Act defenders were right in their claims 
that the Jones Act did not disrupt the oil spill cleanup efforts, it is 
evident that a hypothetical America facing a comparable oil spill 
without the Jones Act would be less filled with conjecture, finger 
pointed, and red tape and better able to concentrate on the relief 
efforts. 
 
 97.  Id.  
 98.  H. Clayton Cook Jr., Don’t Blame Delays on the Jones Act, WALL. ST. 
J., July 10, 2010, at A12, available at http://online.wsj.com/article$B1000 
1424052748703636404575353423992842474.html. 
99. Id.; 46 U.S.C.S. § 55113 (2006). The statute provides:  
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an oil spill response 
vessel documented under the laws of a foreign country may operate 
in waters of the United States on an emergency and temporary 
basis, for the purpose of recovering, transporting, and unloading in a 
United States port oil discharged as a result of an oil spill in or near 
those waters, if--(1) an adequate number and type of oil spill 
response vessels documented under the laws of the United States 
cannot be engaged to recover oil from an oil spill in or near those 
waters in a timely manner, as determined by the Federal On-Scene 
Coordinator for a discharge or threat of a discharge of oil; and (2) the 
foreign country has by its laws accorded to vessels of the United 
States the same privileges accorded to vessels of the foreign country 
under this section. 
 100.  National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling, supra note 95, at 143. 
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B.   Short Sea Shipping 
The U.S.-build requirement of the Jones Act will potentially 
restrict development in one of the few areas where maritime 
growth is expected: short-sea shipping.  Prior to World War II, 
“short-sea shipping,” which encompasses shipping operations 
along the coasts and inland waterways, was a robust enterprise in 
America.101  However, following World War II, America enjoyed an 
extensive development of its highway system which enabled the 
proliferation of trucking as the preferred and most cost-effective 
means of transporting goods around the country.102  Given the 
prohibitive costs imposed by the Jones Act, including the 
employment of only U.S. crews and use of only American-built 
vessels, short-sea shipping struggled to compete with trucking, 
especially because trucking was benefited by relatively low fuel 
costs and minimal traffic congestion for several decades.103  
Recently, because of high fuel costs, paralyzing highway 
congestion, a dearth of truck drivers, and an inadequate highway 
system, which is no longer expanding, there has been a renewed 
interest in the viability of increased short-sea shipping.104 
Today, short-sea shipping is a part of an intermodal 
transportation network.105  The first part of the process is referred 
to as “drayage,” which is the transportation of goods a short 
distance by truck from their origin to a nearby port.106 Next, a 
vessel transports the goods over a medium or long distance to 
another port where they are subsequently picked up by another 
truck which brings the goods a short distance to their final 
destination.107  This process is streamlined by the use of roll on, 
 
 101.  See Global Insight, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF 
THE SECRETARY/MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, Four Corridor Case Studies of 
Short-Sea Shipping Services, U.S. Dept of Trans. Office of the Secretary / 
Maritime Administration, (Aug. 15, 2006), at 1, available at 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/USDOT_-_Four_Corridors_Case_Study 
_ (15-Aug-06).pdf [hereafter Four Corridor]. 
 102.  Id. at 1-2. 
 103.  Id. at 2. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Anastassios N. Perakis & Athanasios Denisis, A Survey of Short Sea 
Shipping and its Prospects in the USA, 35 MARIT. POL’Y & MGMT. 591, 595 
(2008), available at http://intermodalmarine.com/pdfs/Survey%20of%20SSS% 
20Prospects%20in%20the%20U.S..pdf. 
 106.  Four Corridor, supra note 101, at 1. 
 107.  Id. 
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roll off vessels, called Ro-Ro vessels, which allow trucks or other 
cargo to be easily transferred on and off the vessel.108 
In 2007, optimism for increased short-sea shipping grew when 
President Bush signed the Energy Independence and Security Act 
of 2007, which included a Short Sea Transportation Initiative.109  
The Act set forth that “The Secretary of Transportation shall 
establish a short sea transportation program and designate short 
sea transportation projects to be conducted under the program to 
mitigate landside congestion.”110  However, despite its sensible 
purpose and strong industry and political support, the initiative 
has been slow to create traction for short-sea shipping since it did 
not authorize additional funding or account for some prohibitive 
obstacles.111  One necessity is investing in the infrastructure to 
support short-sea shipping—this includes alterations to port 
facilities so that they can accommodate increased vessel traffic.  In 
addition, while current sea ports are designed mainly for large, 
oceangoing vessels which utilize cranes to transfer cargo, short-
sea shipping vessels will require ramps and wide dock space so 
trucks can roll on and off the vessels.112  Not surprisingly, some 
stakeholders have blamed the U.S.-build provisions of the Jones 
Act for impeding the economic viability of a meaningful 
development in short-sea shipping.113  Most of these complaints 
focus on the increased start-up costs for short-sea shipping, since 
purchasing a vessel from the global market is substantially less 
 
 108.  Perakis, supra note 105, at 595.  Ro-Ro vessels are contrasted with 
Lo-Lo vessels (lift on, lift off), which are generally smaller containerships 
which require cranes to lift cargo onto and off of the vessel.  Id. at 593. 
 109.  David J. Farrell Jr., America’s Marine Highway a/k/a Short-Sea 
Shipping: A Win-Win Proposition, 5 BENEDICT’S MAR. BULL., 221, 221 (3rd/4th 
Quarter 2007), available at http://www.sealaw.org/documents/ShortSea 
Shipping.pdf. Farrell cites truck pollution and traffic as the impetus for the 
short-sea shipping initiative, and notes that, “Americans annually lose 3.7 
billion hours, wasting 2.3 billion gallons of fuel, at a cost of $200 billion just 
sitting in traffic.”  Id. at 222. 
 110.  Short Sea Transportation, 46 U.S.C. § 55601(a) (2007 & Supp. 2012). 
 111.  Bryant E. Gardner, Short Sea Shipping Steams Ahead, 7 BENEDICT’S 
MAR. BULL., 112, 113 (2nd /3rd Quarter 2009), available at 
http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/Publications/Gardner_2.pdf. 
 112.  U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Freight Transportation: Short Sea 
Shipping Option Shows Importance of Systematic Approach to Investment 
Decisions, at 13-14 (July 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new 
.items/d05768.pdf [hereinafter GAO 2005 Report]. 
 113.  Garnder, supra note 111, at 115.  
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expensive than purchasing the equivalent vessel from a U.S. 
shipyard.114 
IV. PROPOSALS 
Reform of the Jones Act is required if America is serious 
about pursuing certain maritime-related goals, reducing highway 
congestion and pollution, promoting a swift response to coastal 
disasters, and benefiting its economy as a whole.  The first step is 
repealing the U.S.-build requirement of the Jones Act.115  For 
shipping companies, replacement of their aging Jones Act fleets 
will be a critical issue in the coming years, and obtaining 
financing for new vessel construction in our current stagnant 
economy could prove an insurmountable challenge.116  Given that 
foreign-made vessels, equivalent if not superior in quality, could 
be purchased at a fraction of the cost, it seems contrary to 
America’s general economic principles to prohibit such 
purchasing.  Not only will repealing the U.S.-build requirement of 
the Jones Act benefit existing shipping companies, it may foster 
an era of new shipping companies which can provide the industry 
with much-needed competition.  Furthermore, it may serve as the 
catalyst that America’s complacent shipbuilding companies need 
to innovate and streamline their operations. 
Secondly, the United States should liberalize its cabotage 
laws with the goal of achieving a middle ground on the global 
spectrum of cabotage regimes. Despite purportedly embracing 
liberal economic policies, the United States’ approach to cabotage 
laws is much more closely aligned with the Chinese’s ultra-
restrictive cabotage regime than it is with the moderate approach 
implemented by the European Union or the liberal policies 
employed in Australia and New Zealand.117  Similar to America, 
China prohibits international shipping companies from 
transporting goods between Chinese ports; although, the Chinese 
government takes things a step further by also setting shipping 
 
 114.  GAO 2005 Report, supra note 112, at 13. 
 115.  46 U.S.C. § 55102 (2006). 
 116.  See Hansen, Dilemma, supra note 48, at 4. 
 117.  Mary R. Brooks, Liberalization in Maritime Transport, Int’l Transp. 
Forum (2009), available at http://www.Internationaltransportforum.org/Pup 
/pdf/09FP02.pdf. 
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prices—a socialist practice repugnant to America.118  Other 
nations with restrictive cabotage laws include Japan, which 
restricts its coastwise shipping, including among its many islands, 
to just Japanese shipping companies.119  Interestingly, because of 
its high labor rates, Japanese cargo companies will send large 
quantities of its international cargo to nearby Korea for 
transshipment to the United States and Europe to take advantage 
of the lower rates offered by international Korean shipping 
companies.120 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are countries like 
Australia and New Zealand, which have very liberal cabotage 
regimes.121  In Australia, coastwise trade, referred to locally as 
“coasting” trade, is open to foreign ship operators and regulated by 
a permit and licensing system.122  Coasting trade, governed by the 
Navigation Act of 1912,123 was liberalized in 1998, partly because 
the nation was forced to turn to international freight service since 
it was not equipped to meet demand.124  Australia’s clever 
licensing system includes requirements designed to prevent 
foreign-labor abuses and advantages—an aspect of certain concern 
in the United States.  To be issued a permit, a foreign shipping 
company is mandated to pay its crew Australian wages and 
cannot be subsidized by its government while it operates on the 
Australian coast.125  In addition, security is addressed by 
mandating that foreign shipping companies and their vessels 
must satisfy the requirements of the International Maritime 
Organization126 and the International Labor Organization.127 
In the middle of the spectrum is the European Union, which 
liberalized its coastwise trade laws in 1992 to permit any EU-
 
 118.  Id. at 15.   
 119.  Id. at 14. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 6-8. 
 122.  Id. at 6-7. 
 123.  Navigation Act of 1912, Part VI – THE COASTING TRADE,  
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/na1912123/. 
 124.  Brooks, supra note 117, at 6.   
 125.  Id. at 7. 
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flagged vessel to transport goods to any port in the European 
Union.128  Prior to 1992, several northern European nations129 
already had open, liberal cabotage laws, while southern European 
nations130  had closed, restrictive laws.131  Despite its 
liberalization, the European Union’s approach to cabotage is still 
considered a middle ground between Australia and the United 
States/China as it allows member nations to impose crew 
nationality requirements, vessel ownership restrictions, and other 
fiscal requirements.132  The European Union, in an effort to 
improve efficiency of road freight, also has liberalized its road 
cabotage laws to allow a hauler to conduct three cabotage 
operations within a seven day period after unloading international 
cargo.133  This provision seeks to prevent trucks from being driven 
long distances without carrying any freight, which wastes fuel and 
contributes to traffic congestion.134 
America’s new regime should be a combination of Australia’s 
licensing program and the European Union’s road cabotage 
policies. Using this system as a model, the United States should 
sell licenses to foreign shipping companies that would permit 
them to deliver goods to the United States and then complete up 
to three cabotage operations before departing for an international 
port.  This regime would provide the U.S. government with some 
revenue in the form of licensing fees and would promote coastwise 
shipping competition between American and foreign nations likely 
without destroying the U.S. merchant marine entirely.  While 
maritime jobs may be lost initially, existing American shipping 
companies, which already service the domestic shipping market, 
will have a natural competitive advantage—a tremendous head 
start—over new, foreign competitors.  This valuable advantage 
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combined with a repeal of the U.S.-build requirement of the Jones 
Act should give domestic shipping companies the tools it needs to 
implement efficiencies, innovate, and compete.  Competition and 
innovation are inherently American principles, and it is time to 
funnel these principles into the maritime industry by reforming 
the Jones Act. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The American ideal is a nation of progressive ideas and 
innovation.  Since this country was founded, Americans have been 
able to invent, improve, perfect, and prosper in large part because 
the nation’s laws did not stand in their way.  However, no 
legislature is perfect, and at times certain laws have had 
unintended negative consequences.  Certainly, the intention of the 
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 was not to inflate the prices of 
consumer goods, or to create insurmountable barriers of entry for 
domestic shipping companies, or to foster the decline of the quality 
and quantity of American shipbuilding.  A vibrant, robust U.S. 
merchant marine does not need to be relegated to the confines of a 
footnote in a history book, but that is where it is headed. The 
domestic shipping industry has become increasingly complacent in 
its diminishing role, and Jones Act reform will provide the spark 
needed to reverse this course. 
 
